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ABSTRACT
A growing majority of Americans support the implementation
of a national single-payer healthcare program, also known as
Medicare for All, which would shift payments for healthcare
services to a single public payer and provide care based on need
rather than ability to pay. However, legislators, scholars, and
advocates have suggested state governments rather than the federal
government should take the lead by implementing state-specific
single-payer programs. Dozens of single-payer proposals have been
introduced in state legislatures across the country, and there is
increasing interest in Congress in removing the federal roadblocks
to state-specific single-payer’s implementation. Proponents of statespecific single-payer rely on the conventional wisdom that states—
as U.S. federalism’s “laboratories of democracy”—can prove the
concept of single-payer to other states, who will adopt it in time.
But, in taking the “laboratories of democracy” theory at face
value, advocates of state-based single-payer ignore a number of
realities. This Article argues state-based single-payer is not a
stepping stone to health justice or the implementation of national
single-payer and that it is, rather, a stumbling block that will worsen
health inequities in the United States and ultimately make the
implementation of a national single-payer system even less likely
than it is now. In order to demonstrate this, I analyze the history of
state government experimentation in healthcare to conclude the
laboratories of democracy theory has been tested in the healthcare
domain and failed, harming the nation’s most vulnerable and
historically oppressed people. Using the example of the Affordable
Care Act Medicaid expansion, I discuss the historic and present
antidemocratic state government resistance to programs that
promote health justice. Furthermore, I employ a political theory
analysis to conclude the implementation of state-specific singlepayer programs will worsen health disparities by weakening the
bargaining power of existing federal programs and fracturing a
growing constituency in favor of national single-payer, chilling
popular momentum toward a national single-payer program.
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“[I]n medicine the dream of reason has partially come true. But
medicine is also, unmistakably, a world of power where some are
more likely to receive the rewards of reason than are others.”2 The
struggle for health justice in the United States is emblematic of U.S.
politics. The struggle takes place between states and the federal
government; between powerful lobbying behemoths and grassroots
movements; and between private profit-motivated companies and
patients seeking care. Ever-increasing household healthcare
expenses, including private insurance costs, result in health decline,
debt, and bankruptcy. And those who receive means-tested public
health coverage are subject to marginalization and austerity. For
these and many other reasons, a growing cross-demographic
constituency supports a transition to a national single-payer
healthcare program, sometimes referred to as “Medicare for All.” A
national single-payer program would make healthcare free at the
point of service for all U.S. residents. It would make healthcare
available based on need rather than ability to pay, and it would be a
stepping stone to achieving health justice in the U.S.
But as single-payer has grown in popularity, a number of
scholars and proponents have suggested the United States should
take a state-based rather than a national approach to achieving
single-payer healthcare. There is even pending legislation in
Congress that would remove major federal roadblocks to states
implementing their own single-payer programs. Advocates of the
state-based approach rely on the “laboratories of democracy” theory
of federalism, arguing that individual states should lead the way in
proving the merits of single-payer, resulting in its adoption
throughout the U.S. Although analysis of this shift to the
laboratories approach has focused largely on what the federal
government should do to enable states to conduct their own
experiments with single-payer healthcare, this Article takes a deeper
look at whether the laboratories of democracy theory holds water in
the healthcare arena, and whether state-based single-payer is
actually the stepping stone to health justice its advocates say it will
be.
Unfortunately, however well-meaning the push for state-based
single-payer may be, I conclude it is in fact a stumbling block rather
than a stepping stone to national single-payer and, ultimately, to
health justice in the United States. In Section I, I describe the basic
contours of a national single-payer program based on current
Congressional Medicare for All proposals and situate these
proposals within a health justice framework. In Section II, I describe
recent efforts toward state-specific single-payer programs and the
2
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legal theories—in particular the “laboratories of democracy”
theory—underlying the efforts to shift the conversation from
national to state-based single-payer. In Section III, I undertake a
historical and legal analysis of the history of states as laboratories of
democracy in healthcare. Using the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion as an example, I conclude the laboratories of democracy
theory—as applied to healthcare—is largely mythic, as there is
strong evidence state governments do not use “innovation” in
healthcare to promote health or meet the unique needs of their
residents. In fact, state governments have often been the primary
obstacle to democratic efforts to achieve health justice. Finally, in
Section IV, I discuss the fundamental necessity of payer bargaining
power in healthcare financing and explain how state-specific singlepayer programs would worsen the state-by-state and regional
disparities by weakening the bargaining power of federal programs
like Medicare and Medicaid, which cover the nation’s most
vulnerable patients. I then employ a political theory analysis to
explain how state-specific single-payer would fracture a growing
national constituency, chilling popular momentum toward a national
single-payer program. Therefore, I conclude, rather than being a
positive or even neutral stepping stone toward national single-payer
and health justice in the U.S., a state-specific single-payer approach
is actually a stumbling block to national single-payer and therefore
is an undesirable project when viewed through a health justice lens.
I. NATIONAL SINGLE-PAYER HEALTHCARE AND HEALTH
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
Although a national-single-payer healthcare program—
sometimes referred to as “Medicare for All”—has been on the
national agenda for decades, it received spikes in interest and
coverage around the 2016 and 2020 U.S. general elections, as the
public began to demand electoral candidates have a position on
healthcare and increasingly supported the idea of a universal public
healthcare program. A majority of Americans support a transition
national single-payer program as an alternative to the U.S.’s highly
fragmented public-private healthcare financing system, in which the
healthcare is provided based on ability to pay rather than need.
From a health justice perspective, the need for and the merits of
a national single-payer program seem clear. Health outcomes in the
U.S. are deeply unequal, not just along race, class, and disability
lines, but along regional lines as well. And the fragmented system
undermines social solidarity and reinforces the idea that individuals,
rather than systems, are “to blame” for poor health outcomes. This
Section provides a setting for understanding the debate about statespecific single-payer by describing what national single-payer
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health care and health justice are, and by situating single-payer
proposals within a health justice framework.
A. Medicare for All, Who Is Promoting It, and Why
An increasing majority of Americans across the political
spectrum believes the federal government has a “responsibility to
make sure all Americans have health coverage.”3 And in 2020,
thirty-six percent of Americans—a six-percent increase over the
previous year—said healthcare coverage should be provided
through a single national program.4 The number of Americans
supporting a national single-payer healthcare program, often
referred to as Medicare for All,5 eclipsed the numbers of both
individuals who preferred a mix of public and private insurance
programs and those who supported merely a continuation of existing
Medicare and Medicaid.6 Other polls have indicated majority
support among both self-identified Republicans and Democrats for
Medicare for All with “only 20 percent of Americans saying they
outright oppose the idea.”7 It is unsurprising that Americans
increasingly find the existing hybrid public-private health insurance
3

Bradley Jones, Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government
Program to Provide Health Care Coverage, Pew Research Center (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-ofamericans-favor-a-single-government-program-to-provide-health-carecoverage/.
4
Bradley Jones, Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government
Program to Provide Health Care Coverage, Pew Research Center (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-ofamericans-favor-a-single-government-program-to-provide-health-carecoverage/.
5
“Medicare for All” is a somewhat slippery term, but, as described later, generally
serves as a stand-in for a program that would move the United States healthcare
financing system from a fragmented hybrid public-private risk-based system to a
national single-payer that covers all residents (some proposals would only cover
U.S. citizens) and eliminates out-of-pocket costs for patients. The term has come
into popularity in the years since Michigan Representative John Conyers
introduced the United States National Health Care Act—also known the
Expanded and Improved Medicare for All Act—in 2003. Conyers introduced the
bill annually between 2003 and his retirement in 2017, and support of the bill grew
from an original twenty-five co-sponsors to 124. The bill was renumbered,
expanded, and re-introduced in 2019 by Representative Pramila Jayapal.
6
Bradley Jones, Increasing Share of Americans Favor a Single Government
Program to Provide Health Care Coverage, Pew Research Center (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-ofamericans-favor-a-single-government-program-to-provide-health-carecoverage/.
7
Yoni Blumberg, 70% of Americans Now Support Medicare-for-All—Here’s
How Single-Payer Could Affect You, CNBC (Aug, 28, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/28/most-americans-now-support-medicare-forall-and-free-college-tuition.html.
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system in the United States untenable and long for an alternative. A
single-payer system provides healthcare based on need rather than
ability to pay, and that idea is appealing to Americans who
increasingly find care costs unpredictable, prohibitive, and
financially ruinous.
This Section briefly describes the current state of the U.S.
healthcare financing system and sets out working definitions of
terms like “single-payer healthcare” and provides an overview of the
current proposals for single-payer healthcare in the United States. It
also describes the ways in which a transition to a national singlepayer system in the United States is a stepping stone on the path to
achieving health justice. Although there are numerous proposals for
single-payer healthcare in the United States and numerous
worldwide models of national healthcare systems, only a basic
understanding of the technicalities of a single-payer healthcare
financing system is necessary to engage with my arguments. In
particular, I rely on the two most prominent single-payer proposals
in Congress as guideposts because they focus almost solely on
changes to health financing. Other national models, such as the
British National Health Service, are important to look to as models
of healthcare solidarity and nationalized service provision and
provider training, but their details go far beyond the financing
changes involved in current proposals to shift the United States to a
single-payer system. In this paper, single-payer healthcare means
health coverage for all U.S. residents paid for by a single public
payer regardless of means and the elimination of deductibles, copays
and co-insurance. This would be a vast departure from the current
public-private hybrid healthcare financing system, in which the
provision of care is based on ability to pay for those who have
private insurance coverage or on demonstration of deservingness
(through means testing and determinations of disability) for those
who have public coverage.
1. The Fragmented and Unequal U.S. Healthcare System
Healthcare costs—which also include the cost of health
insurance—eat up an increasing portion of household budgets in the
United States and medical bills are the number one cause of U.S.
household bankruptcies8 and healthcare debt accounts for the largest
portion of all U.S. debts in collection.9 This is not because our
8

Robert Buonaspina, Now Is the Time for the NY Health Act, LONG ISLAND PRESS
(Jul. 19, 2020), https://www.longislandpress.com/2020/07/19/now-is-the-timefor-the-ny-health-act/.
9
Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, Americans’ Medical Debts Are Bigger Than
Was Known, Totaling $140 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/upshot/medical-debt-americansmedicaid.html.
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healthcare has improved dramatically year by year or is provided
more equitably to more people, or even because care itself always
costs more. The primary reason for the more than 100 percent
increase in household healthcare spending over the past four
decades is primarily insurance costs (as distinguished from care
costs), “which have grown by 740% since 1984. . . . The average
American paid about $3,400 for insurance alone in 2018.”10 Despite
the massive increase in household expenses on insurance, private
health insurance—which covers slightly more than half of
Americans, sometimes in concert with some form of public
insurance11—covers an even smaller share of out-of-pocket
healthcare expenses than it did a decade ago. “Employer-based
[private] insurance for families costs about $20,576 this year, about
a 5% increase from last year. Yet families are still on the hook for
an average of $6,015 in out-of-pocket expenses, which is about a
71% increase over the past 10 years.”12 These increases have far
outpaced the marginal wage increases of the past few decades, and
healthcare costs even for insured people are overwhelming.
The backdrop of a system that has become increasingly
financially untenable is one in which health injustice is rampant. The
U.S. infant mortality rate—a common indicator of population
health—is seventy-one percent higher overall than the average of
comparable countries, and infant mortality among Black and
indigenous people far exceeds even the sobering national average.13
U.S. life expectancy is higher for white people than Black and
indigenous people, and—importantly—regional disparities persist
even regardless of race. Among both white and Black Americans
who live in the Southeast, life expectancy is far lower than the
national average. As explained in far greater detail later, much of
this is attributable to healthcare in the United States being—
particularly for poor and disabled people—largely the domain of
states against a backdrop of federal regulation. Our healthcare
system encounters—and reproduces—the outcomes of inequitable
10

Megan Leonhardt, Americans Now Spend Twice As Much on Health Care As
They
Did
in
the
1980s,
CNBC.COM
(Oct.
9,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/americans-spend-twice-as-much-on-healthcare-today-as-in-the-1980s.html.
11
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Healthcare Coverage and Spending (Jan.
26, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10830.pdf.
12
Megan Leonhardt, Americans Now Spend Twice As Much on Health Care As
They
Did
in
the
1980s,
CNBC.COM
(Oct.
9,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/americans-spend-twice-as-much-on-healthcare-today-as-in-the-1980s.html.
13
See Rabah Kamal, Julie Hudman, & Daniel McDermott, What Do We Know
About Infant Mortality in the U.S. and Comparable Countries?, PETERSONKAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/infant-mortality-u-scompare-countries/#item-start.
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societal inputs. This includes a tendency in politics—sometimes
intentional and sometimes unconscious—to blame poor, disabled,
and Black people and other people of color for their own health
outcomes rather than focusing on the fact that they have worse
access to worse care because of historic and current oppressive
structures in healthcare and healthcare financing.14 Regional health
inequalities also then, unsurprisingly, map onto issues such as
school segregation,15 income,16 and economic mobility.17 The
overlap in these disparities demonstrates there are structural bases
for health inequities in the United States, and a single-payer
healthcare system is one way to target a deeply structural problem.
2. Proposals for National Single Payer Healthcare
Two related pieces of proposed federal legislation outline the
contours of a potential single-payer healthcare financing18 system in
the United States. The Medicare for All Act,19 was introduced by
Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and the corresponding Medicare
for All Act of 2021,20 was introduced by Washington Representative
Pramila Jayapal with 117 co-sponsors in the House. The House bill
is the more expansive vision of the actual coverage a national singlepayer program would provide, particularly because it was the first
Medicare for All bill to propose bringing long-term care services
under the umbrella of services paid for by the single federal payer,
a key provision for disability and elder justice. The inclusion of
long-term care services under the House single-payer proposal is
illustrative of how “Medicare for All” is something of a misnomer,
14

See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth
of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016); see also Ibram X. Kendi, Stop
Blaming Black People for Dying of the Coronavirus, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 14,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/race-andblame/609946/.
15
Reed Jordan, America's Public Schools Remain Highly Segregated, URBAN
INSTITUTE (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/americas-publicschools-remain-highly-segregated.
16
Andy Kiersz, America Is the Land of Unequal Opportunity. These 13 Maps
Show How Class, Education, and Health Inequities All Intersect—With Nonwhite,
Rural Areas Hit Especially Hard, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-maps-show-overlapping-inequities-2021-4.
17
Andy Kiersz, America Is the Land of Unequal Opportunity. These 13 Maps
Show How Class, Education, and Health Inequities All Intersect—With Nonwhite,
Rural Areas Hit Especially Hard, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-maps-show-overlapping-inequities-2021-4.
18
Current proposals for single-payer would largely shift healthcare financing
only, rather than establishing a national healthcare system in which providers are
employed by a national health services, such as in Britain, and where medical and
health education is also subsidized.
19
S.B. 1129, Medicare for All Act of 2019, 116th Congress (2019).
20
H.R. 1976, Medicare for All Act of 2021, 117th Congress (2021).
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as current Medicare does not cover long-term care services for its
beneficiaries, nor does it pay for healthcare in full even for care it
does cover. In fact, the Medicare program only covers about twothirds of care costs for its average beneficiary.21 The inclusion of
long-term care services under single-payer, and the requirement that
all care be free at the point of service, demonstrates the ways in
which a single-payer system can seek not just to shift financing, but
to promote health justice and meet needs completely unmet by the
existing system.
The House bill provides a summary of what exactly single-payer
legislation seeks to establish. The bill:
. . . establishes a national health insurance program that is
administered by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).
Among other requirements, the program must (1) cover all
U.S. residents; (2) provide for automatic enrollment of
individuals upon birth or residency in the United States; and
(3) cover items and services that are medically necessary or
appropriate to maintain health or to diagnose, treat, or
rehabilitate a health condition, including hospital services,
prescription drugs, mental health and substance abuse
treatment, dental and vision services, and long-term care.
The bill prohibits cost-sharing (e.g., deductibles,
coinsurance, and copayments) and other charges for covered
services. Additionally, private health insurers and employers
may only offer coverage that is supplemental to, and not
duplicative of, benefits provided under the program . . . .22
These general provisions—specifically, coverage for all U.S.
residents in a non-means-tested regime, coverage of dental, vision,
and long-term care, and the elimination of deductibles, copays and
co-insurance—describe the basic structure of a federal single-payer
program and are used as a benchmark for the type of healthcare
system single-payer advocates seek.23 There are several ways in
21

Sarah O’Brien, Medicare Isn’t Free. Here’s How Much You May Need to Pay
For
It
In
Retirement,
CNBC.COM
(Jun.
11,
2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/11/medicare-isnt-free-how-much-you-need-tocover-costs-in-retirement.html.
22
Congressional Research Service, Summary: H.R.1384 - Medicare for All Act of
2019, 116th Congress (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/housebill/1384?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22medicare+for+all+act
%5C%22%22%5D%7D&s=3&r=1.
23
Notably, this falls short of demands for a stronger, more centrally regulated and
funded healthcare system such as the U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS). The
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which a national single-payer program would lay a foundation for
realizing health justice in the United States, but first, it is important
to define health justice as a worthy legislative and policy priority.
B. Health Justice as a Legislative and Policy Priority
Healthcare reform in the United States should seek primarily to
promote health and health justice,24 and a national single-payer
program is a stepping stone toward health justice.25 But what is
health justice? At its root, health justice is a state of equity in which
the health system works alongside community members to envision
an environment that promotes health rather than destroying it or
subordinating it to non-health concerns, such as profit or social
control. It is about ensuring that all people, regardless of their
socioeconomic background or standing, have quality healthcare.26
current viable proposals for single-payer healthcare in the U.S. focus largely on
the health financing system rather than on public care systems and public medical
education. This is one example of why I conceive of a national single-payer
program as a means to health justice, but not its end.
24
As opposed to, say, protecting the profits of insurance companies or subsidizing
the private market for the market’s sake, or promoting other social goals such as
increases in employment.
25
See Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the
Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 337
(2015) (“The preponderance of the evidence clearly indicates the urgent need for
robust measures that address the deleterious effects of economic, societal,
cultural, environmental, and social conditions, as well as the policies and legal
systems that have devastating effects on health. This knowledge of social
determinants of health should be integrated into the policy-making and judicial
decision making processes. Policies, laws, and social structures must anticipate,
and be designed to mitigate, the effects of socioeconomic inequality and the social
determinants of poor health.”).
26
I eschew the popular framing of “access” to healthcare when discussing the
right to healthcare. Access is an amorphous political term that rarely describes the
same thing. For example, a person may be perceived as having “access to care”
simply because they have some kind of health insurance coverage, regardless of
whether they can actually afford their care at the point of service. See Urban
Institute, Bowen Garrett & Anuj Gangopadhyaya, Who Gained Health Insurance
Coverage Under the ACA, and Where Do They Live? (Dec. 2016),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/86761/2001041-whogained-health-insurance-coverage-under-the-aca-and-where-do-they-live.pdf
(“Repeal of the ACA without new policies capable of maintaining the coverage
gains achieved since 2010 would result in millions of Americans, of all ages and
backgrounds and in all states, losing health insurance along with the access to
health care and financial protections it affords.”). Sometimes the “access” is a
rhetorical flourish that could be eliminated altogether. See How Many Americans
Are
Uninsured
(2021),
POLICYADVICE.NET,
https://policyadvice.net/insurance/insights/how-many-uninsuredamericans/#:~:text=6.,with%20a%20health%20insurance%20provider (“Reports
indicate that in 2016, roughly 1 out of 10 Americans did not have access to health
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Equity is not a corollary or optional consideration in healthcare.
“Health protection,” the ultimate goal of any healthcare system,
encapsulates “equity—timely access not linked to employment
status or ability to pay” and “financial protection against
catastrophic health expenditure” among other key parameters that
should drive political decisions about which type of healthcare
system to construct to best promote the health of a population.27
A primary feature of programs that promote health justice is the
elimination of means-testing in healthcare financing. Means-testing
creates healthcare programs that only cover specific populations and
have income or other qualification requirements and is itself is an
obstacle to health justice. It not only eliminates certain groups of
people for consideration for public benefits altogether, but also it
creates barriers for people who are putatively eligible for programs,
resulting in under-utilization of benefits28 and churn (the process
“beneficiaries moving in and out of . . . coverage,” resulting in
“delayed care and less preventative care.”29). These barriers are
outputs of a system that uses insurance rather than need as a
gatekeeper to care.
Because health outcomes—and the U.S. healthcare and
healthcare finance system as a whole—are inextricably intertwined
with other social issues, researchers often point to “social
determinants of health” as causes of health disparities in the U.S.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) define
“health disparities” as:
preventable differences in the burden of disease, injury,
violence, or opportunities to achieve optimal health that are
experienced by socially disadvantaged populations.
Populations can be defined by factors such as race or
ethnicity, gender, education or income, disability, geographic
insurance yet, meaning that roughly 91.5% of Americans were enrolled with a
health insurance provider.”). The former example is more insidious because it
obscures a number of factors standing in the way of true “access,” such as out-ofpocket and at-the-point-of-service costs that prevent many individuals from
seeking healthcare (i.e., limiting access). A right to healthcare, rather than seeking
to achieve “access” prevents blame-shifting for poor outcomes to patients rather
than to healthcare systems as a whole.
27
P. Petrou, G. Samoutis, & C. Lionis, Single-payer or a Multipayer Health
System: A Systematic Literature Review, 163 PUBLIC HEALTH 141, 142 (2018).
28
For example, approximately six million Medicaid-eligible people in the U.S. do
not actually receive Medicaid. Louise Radnofsky, Millions Eligible for Medicaid
Go
Without
It,
WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Jan.
31,
2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/millions-eligible-for-medicaid-go-without-it1454277166.
29
Sarah Sugar, Christie Peters, Nancy De Lew, Benjamin D. Sommers, U.S. Dept.
of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and
Management, Medicaid Churning and Continuity of Care: Evidence and Policy
Considerations Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/265366/medicaid-churning-ib.pdf.
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location (e.g., rural or urban), or sexual orientation. Health
disparities are inequitable and are directly related to the
historical and current unequal distribution of social, political,
economic, and environmental resources.30
Health justice describes an absence of disparities,31 and a national
single-payer program, which signals universal deservedness across
the population and makes care free at the point of service, is a step
toward addressing health disparities. Health justice requires far
more, of course, but removing a primary barrier to healthcare—
costs—moves the needle, as does the creation of a universal
program in which everyone has a vested interest. For policy and law
to promote health justice, we must create “a regulatory and
jurisprudential approach that consistently and reliably considers the
health ramifications of judicial and legislative decision making.”32
Health justice is also promoted when programs are universal,
and thus less subject to political whims subsequent to their
implementation. Stability and universality also promotes health
justice in multiple ways. The more people who benefit from a
program, the more politically popular it becomes, thus making it
incredibly politically risky to undermine or cut back.33 Take, as an
30

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Health Disparities Among
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https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/disparities/index.htm#:~:text=Health%20disp
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31
“Health disparities do not refer generically to all health differences, or even to
all health differences warranting focused attention. They are a specific subset of
health differences of particular relevance to social justice because they may arise
from intentional or unintentional discrimination or marginalization and, in any
case, are likely to reinforce social disadvantage and vulnerability. Disparities in
health and its determinants are the metric for assessing health equity, the principle
underlying a commitment to reducing disparities in health and its determinants;
health equity is social justice in health.” Paula A. Braveman et al., Health
Disparities and Health Equity: The Issue Is Justice, American Journal of Public
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Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the
Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 337
(2015)
33
Luke Darby, Why Are So Many Democrats Opposed to Universal Programs?,
GQ (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/means-testing-democrats
(“SNAP is what's known as a "means tested" program, meaning that people are
only eligible for it if they meet set income requirements and other criteria.
Medicaid, the federal program that provides health care to millions of people
living in poverty, is another means tested program. This is in contrast to
"universal" programs, like libraries, fire departments, and public schools—
everyone in America, regardless of how much or how little money they make, has
a right to use these resources. Often, universal programs are massively popular. A
Pew Research study from this past summer, for example, found that a staggering
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example, the top issue of U.S. voters in the 2020 election: preventing
cuts to Social Security benefits.34 Of course, Social Security benefits
are not truly universal, in that individuals must accrue enough work
credits to obtain Social Security Retirement benefits in old age, but
Social Security benefits are entitlements for those eligible and 48.9
million retirees (about one-sixth of the U.S. population) and their
dependents currently receive Retirement,35 with tens of millions
more counting on the benefit in the future.36 The more people who
count on a benefit, the less likely it is that a political class hostile to
the benefit can find a constituency to oppose it. Simply put,
universal programs are popular, and individuals are likely to see
programs that promote health and livelihoods in a positive light.
Notably, voters’ second-most reported top issue in the 2020 election
was “[a]chieving universal health care.”37 The universality of public
programs, then, is a hallmark of health justice promotion because it
promotes the preservation of those programs.
C. Single-Payer as a Stepping Stone to Achieving Health Justice
A single-payer system would, of course, not cause health justice
to materialize immediately in the United States, but single-payer is
a means to achieving health justice in a number of ways. First and
74 percent of Americans oppose any cuts to Social Security. Since universal
programs are harder to cut, conservatives frequently target ones with means
testing.”); Bryce Covert, Why Americans Love Social Security, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/opinion/democrats-green-newdeal.html (“But there are administrative costs that come with delineating who gets
benefits and who doesn’t. Programs that are narrowly targeted can be less
effective. And, most important for presidential candidates, they lack political
support. Universal programs, on the other hand, not only cultivate strong support
but also tend to get recipients more politically involved. Social Security is an
exemplar universal program. We all contribute to it, we all rely on it, and its broad
scope has given it equally broad appeal and strength.”).
34
Lorie Konish, Preventing Social Security Benefit Cuts is a Top Priority for
Americans in 2020 Election, Survey Finds, CNBC.com (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/19/preventing-social-security-benefit-cuts-is-atop-priority-in-2020-election.html.
35
U.S. Social Security Administration, Fact Sheet—Social Security (2020),
https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/basicfact-alt.pdf.
36
See Mark Miller, Social Security: Where Do the 2020 Candidates Stand?, NEW
YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/business/social-security2020-candidates.html (“No topic is more important than Social Security to the
well-being of today’s older voters—and younger workers who will come to rely
on the program. Nearly all Americans pay into the program and can expect to
receive a benefit. It is the largest retirement income source for a majority of older
households.”).
37
Lorie Konish, Preventing Social Security Benefit Cuts is a Top Priority for
Americans in 2020 Election, Survey Finds, CNBC.com (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/19/preventing-social-security-benefit-cuts-is-atop-priority-in-2020-election.html.
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most straightforwardly, single-payer begins to address health
disparities by removing one of the primary obstacles to care—
cost—from the equation. Costs are a barrier to healthcare for both
insured and uninsured people, meaning even primary and preventive
care are largely out of the reach of people who cannot afford the
high out-of-pocket costs now associated with healthcare. This often
leads people who need complex chronic care, or even simple
primary care, to rely on emergency rooms and urgent care when
health problems come to a head. These individuals and families have
less access to the kind of personalized primary care that improves
health outcomes and prevents emergencies. When a patient is
making the choice between a routine checkup or an appointment to
address a persistent but non-emergency health issue and paying for
rent, food, transportation, etc., health concerns get pushed to the
back burner. And, of course, when making that choice, the current
healthcare system lends itself to information asymmetry—few
people can predict the actual cost of a healthcare encounter, and
many cannot risk being saddled with an unexpected bill. A national
single-payer program that provides healthcare free at the point of
service would eliminate these out-of-pocket cost strains and
promote health justice by eliminating cost considerations from
people’s decisions to seek care. More importantly, though, a
universal program like single payer promotes health justice by
changing our social notions of who “deserves” healthcare, social
notions currently reinforced by the hybrid unequal system of care in
the U.S.38 “Through Black health gains via universal healthcare . . .
the (often unstated) myth that White people ‘earn’ their high rates
of positive health status and outcomes relative to Black people, by
virtue of some attention to care to their bodies and minds that other
groups, including Black people, do not employ, would fall.”39 In this
way, a single-payer system—by providing care based on need rather
than ability to pay—contributes to a sense of social solidarity that
had been undermined and combatted by existing health finance
policy. As a beneficiary of Britain’s NHS put it, “I think it's also a
great pleasure certainly to me, you walk into a room in your surgery.
And it’s full of all sorts of people . . . . I wouldn't like to be thrown
out of a place because I wasn't rich enough. But I also don't want to
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(May
27,
2019),
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be in a place which everybody poorer than me is not getting
access.”40
To illuminate the meaning of health justice and how singlepayer might promote it, it is worth examining why the United States
government—unlike more than seventy countries in the world that
provide universal healthcare—has been so resistant to single-payer
despite popular calls for such a program. As Ampson Hagan puts it,
“[The] U.S. healthcare debate is hardly just about health.
Healthcare, representing a politics by other means, helps determine
the socio-political and economic futures of women, Black people,
and Black women, beyond the intrinsic health outcomes it directly
produces. . . .” The system, in other words, reinforces and
perpetuates ideas about who deserves care and who is to blame for
their own health outcomes. “A Medicare For All program may
prompt us to examine notions of merit and deservingness that have
up to now, been deployed to entrench racial inequality within
existing American social structures.”41 Such a reexamination would
be incredibly threatening to other oppressive structures in the U.S.,
where, “[w]hile other nations focused on access and equality, our
deep-seated attachment to America’s racial hierarchy tied us to a
health care system encompassing racial disparities by design.”42
That is, a national single-payer program, through the implication
that all U.S. residents deserve healthcare, upsets and undermines a
history of U.S. public policy enforcing an oppressive racial and class
order. As discussed in more detail later, this is starkly illustrated in
how states have administered public healthcare programs. “When
we hone in on the demographics of the American populace and think
critically about who is currently underserved by the current medical
system in the U.S., and who stands to benefit from an improved and
more accessible system,” it becomes clear “the healthcare debate has
come to resemble a proxy war of sorts, pitting social welfare
proponents against capitalist hawks who believe in little government
and every man for himself.”43
40
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Additionally, related to its elimination of out-of-pocket costs
and private intermediaries, single-payer system also builds a more
equitable health finance system by removing the insurance
company/provider mismatches that prohibit individuals and families
from seeking the most appropriate care due to insurance network
limitations and restrictions on covered care. Right now, each private
insurance company makes private decisions about when, where,
how, and how much people can seek care, and these rationing
decisions are based on profit motivation and financial risk
assessment, rather than on what a patient’s provider deems
medically necessary. As explained in greater detail later, public
health programs are required to give far more deference to
providers’ recommendations.
Finally, a single payer that covers all U.S. residents is far
better positioned to bargain not just for better prices, but for higher
standards of care, than individual private insurance companies, and
even than the current large federal payers. The ability of a large
single payer to bargain with providers, manufacturers, and suppliers,
is unmatched in the current private-public hybrid U.S. healthcare
system. This bargaining power inheres in the public as well. A
single-payer healthcare program weaves together a single crossdemographic interest group (the U.S. population) out of currently
disconnected constituencies and disease-specific advocacy groups.
This increases the bargaining power of the public as to the healthcare
payer, promoting greater accountability of the payer to patients than
is present in the current system, particularly among patients with
private insurance who must face down private insurance companies
on their own through individualized advocacy and appeals.
Essentially, single-payer is a healthcare financing proposal that also
prioritizes and promotes health justice. And, in the inequitable U.S.
healthcare system, supporters of reform must key in on whether and
how reforms will promote health justice rather than continuing the
process of expanding health coverage piecemeal while maintaining
an untenably unjust and fragmented system.
Beyond the more obvious effects on individual and family
budgets, a national single-payer program lays the groundwork for
healthcare solidarity across the population. By eliminating meanstesting and creating a universal program that covers all residents—
and thus signaling universal deservingness—the terrain of health
struggle is changed in a way that allows for more mass organizing
around health justice demands. When everyone benefits, everyone
has something to lose, and it becomes less and less politically viable
to eliminate programs the closer those programs come to being
black-deservingness.html/. However, as discussed later, federal healthcare payers
do have a history of using their power to lessen health disparities caused by the
states.
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universal. Currently, patient power is widely dispersed, and grows
even more so after every effort to provide healthcare or insurance
coverage to some new specific group succeeds.
For example, as an example of the dispersal of political power
attendant to the typical healthcare reform pathway in the U.S., the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) created new sets of interest groups
invested in preserving the specific provisions that benefitted them,
even if only slightly. But because the healthcare coverage
“provided” by the ACA and the changes it made were not universal,
it left people with preexisting conditions to advocate for that
provision, middle-class people to advocate for middle-class private
insurance subsidies, etc. In essence, instead of creating a
constituency to support the ACA or further reform, the ACA created
many divided constituencies with different and sometimes
competing interests. As lawmakers and courts began chipping away
at the ACA, even its popular provisions lacked mass organizing
around them. One provision of the ACA that has stood the test of
time is its requirement that insurers do not discriminate against
people with preexisting conditions. This provision’s survival is no
surprise. It was the provision that affected the most people of any
ACA provision—one in every two non-elderly Americans by
official estimates44—and its beneficiaries included Americans
across the political and demographic spectrums. Lawmakers could
never repeal the provision because it would have required them to
anger a large constituent group that crossed the boundaries of the
very constituencies they often play against one another45 in order to
achieve electoral victories.
There are many obstacles to achieving universal public
programs in the U.S. The stigmatization of social welfare and the
dividing up of the population into deserving and undeserving groups
is socio-politically constructed at the highest levels of welfare
policy.46 This paradigm is entrenched, but social attitudes favoring
policies such as national single-payer healthcare demonstrate it is
not for inherent lack of public desire that these programs do not
exist. Rather, the failure to achieve universal healthcare in the U.S.
is a systemic and socially constructed problem. A national single44
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payer healthcare program moves the needle toward achieving health
justice in the United States and lays the foundation for health
solidarity across the population, and there is a significant amount of
action toward single-payer at both the federal and state levels, and
advocates see a path forward for single-payer. But, efforts at singlepayer in have stalled in Congress in recent years despite the broad
public support such a program enjoys. In the absence of movement
on single-payer at the federal level, a number of U.S. states have
considered state-based single-payer systems in the hope that our
storied “laboratories of democracy” can take up the mantle of health
justice.
II. THE PUSH FOR STATE-BASED SINGLE-PAYER HEALTHCARE
Before turning to my argument that state-level single-payer
systems will undermine rather than advance health justice, I will
detail the conventional wisdom espoused by policymakers and
advocates: that Congress should act to clear the roadblocks to statelevel single-payer to create a legal path for states to serve as
“laboratories of democracy” where the merits of single-payer will
be proven to other states. This conventional wisdom arises out of a
number of political trends and presumptions. First, multiple state
governments have demonstrated a willingness to move forward with
some popular state-level single-payer efforts. However, the major
obstacle to states moving forward with single-payer is not
necessarily political will, but rather federal preemption.
Scholars and advocates have, therefore, proposed that Congress
act to exempt state-level single-payer from the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)—in particular,
ERISA’s prohibition on state regulation of employer-based
insurance, which covers just under half the U.S. population. Because
ERISA currently prohibits states from regulating employer
insurance, it is almost certainly impossible any state could bring all
of its residents under a single-payer system without running afoul of
federal law.47 But there is a pending proposal in the House of
Representatives to provide the very ERISA exception these states
would need. Although some advocates of state-based single-payer
are in support of a national program and see states as the proper site
of initial implementation and experimentation, some outright prefer
the state-specific approach. Congressional leaders who oppose
national universal programs have expressed a preference for states
to go it alone. For example, although “Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi does not support a national Medicare for All Single Payer
Health Care System, she has encouraged the creation of one or more
47

See generally Erin C. Fuse Brown, Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism,
ERISA, and State Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 389 (2020).
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working models in individual states before it would be considered
on a national level.”48
This state-based approach coming from Congress comports with
and relies on traditional notions of federalism and states as
“laboratories of democracy.”49 However, examination of the history
and uses of state experimentation in healthcare reveals that the
laboratories of democracy theory, as applied to healthcare, has only
worsened state-by-state and regional healthcare disparities in the
United States and has not resulted in the adoption of successfully
“lab-tested” policies throughout the country, even when those
policies unambiguously improve health outcomes and save money.
This Section provides an overview of efforts toward state-level
single-payer and describes how the “laboratories of democracy”
theory undergirds those efforts. In the following Section, I turn to a
discussion of the myriad problems with applying the conventional
assumptions of the laboratories theory to single-payer healthcare
experimentation.
A. Recent State-Based Efforts Toward Single-Payer
Although popular media has followed single-payer healthcare
financing as a matter of national policy surrounding major national
elections, there is much action at the state level receiving far less
attention and scrutiny until recently.50 Advocates of an improved
healthcare system have hailed states as the potential drivers of health
justice and called for states to implement their own single-payer
programs, and have even touted state-based single-payer programs
as a better way to promote health justice than a national program.51
48

Robert Buonaspina, Now Is the Time for the NY Health Act, LONG ISLAND PRESS
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Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018). (“Facilitating state policy experimentation is an
oft-cited justification for the United States' federalism system. Despite growing
recognition of risk aversion, free riding, and other disincentives to state-led
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, a Google trends search for the phrase “Medicare for
All” reveals a peak in interest leading up to U.S. Presidential elections in both
2016 and 2020.
51
See Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 847 (2018) (“What role can progressive states play in
making health justice a reality? At a time when the Trump Administration and the
Republican majority in Congress are undermining the fragile gains of the ACA
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commitments embodied in the Medicaid program, state governments are facing
tough choices. . . . I focus particularly on the efforts of states to succeed where
federal reformers have failed by adopting a state-level public option or single-
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And state legislators have demonstrated a desire to experiment with
single-payer.52 “The volume of state interest and activity in singlepayer health care, as measured by proposed state legislation, has
been substantial. From 2010, when the ACA was enacted, through
2019, legislators in twenty-one states have proposed sixty-six
unique single-payer bills.”53 The COVID-19 pandemic revived or
continued calls for state-based single-payer,54 especially in hard-hit
states like New York.55 These bills demonstrate a real possibility
that states may take up the mantle of single-payer in the absence of
federal movement on a national program.
State-level proposals have not simply languished in legislative
committees and have not been the domain of just a small group of
committed healthcare advocates or so-called “progressive” or
“blue” states; the legislation is not “purely symbolic or precatory.”56
For example, in 2006, the California legislature passed a state
payer health care system. Although state-level public-option and single-payer
health plans face significant obstacles, many believe they are more feasible than
federal reforms. Moreover, I argue, state-level single-payer health care may be
preferable from a health justice perspective because it holds greater promise for
integrating health care, public health, and social safety net program goals to
achieve better health for all.”).
52
See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, Erisa, and
State Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 397 (2020); Lindsay F. Wiley,
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874–75 (2018).
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Health Act, which would provide universal health coverage for every New
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Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, Erisa, and State
Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 397, 400 (2020); see also Erin C.
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commitment of significant resources to understand their economic impact” and
citing examples).
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single-payer bill and only a gubernatorial veto prevented the country
from seeing one of the world’s largest economies attempt to
implement a state-based single-payer system.57 And single-payer
legislation has been introduced in states with a wide variety of
demographic makeups and perceived political leanings, including
Florida, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Michigan, and Oregon.58
However, even advocates of state-based single-payer healthcare
systems recognize legal obstacles to their implementation. Primary
among them is federal preemption of state regulation of employerbased health insurance. Longstanding and durable federal case law
has held the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”) prohibits states from regulating employer-based
insurance and preempts state healthcare initiatives that, even
broadly, “relates to” employer-sponsored health plans.59 ERISA
preemption is no small obstacle, and even proponents of state-based
single-payer acknowledge the unlikelihood of any state-based
program succeeding without substantial ERISA changes, whether
they come legislatively or through the courts.60 Slightly more than
half of American adults and half of American children have some
form of employer-sponsored private health coverage,61 and a state
single-payer program would have to bring all of its residents under
its financing for single-payer to work.62 In fact, Vermont, the state
that got closest to implementing its own single-payer program,
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balked at the last minute partly due to what its governor
characterized as “limitations of federal law.”63
As much as state single-payer supporters would like to see states
implement such programs, even they recognize that implementation
would require federal permission. But recent movement at the
federal level suggests an appetite in Congress for granting individual
states permission to experiment with single-payer programs through
waivers of certain federal rules—primarily ERISA’s preemption of
state regulation of employer-based health insurance coverage—and
allowing states to pool multiple federal healthcare funding sources
into a single stream of state healthcare dollars.
B. The Legal Theories Undergirding State-Based Single-Payer
In 2019, California Representative Ro Khanna—who represents
Silicon Valley—introduced House Resolution 5010, the StateBased Universal Health Care Act of 2019.64 The bill would,
according to proponents, lead the U.S. down the path of “our
neighbors in Canada,”65 where national single-payer was
implemented a decade after Saskatchewan implemented a provincespecific single-payer system in 1962.66 H.R. 5010 would “amend
title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [ACA]” to
provide a “flexible framework” for states to “establish[] . . .
universal health care systems” by exempting states that pass singlepayer legislation from federal rules that currently prohibit or impede
state-level single-payer healthcare programs.67 H.R. 5010 represents
63
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a major effort to provide a federal permission structure for singlepayer healthcare in the states. The bill would allow states whose
residents already participate in federal and federal-state health
insurance programs to pool federal healthcare funds into a general
fund that could then be used to implement universal single-payer
healthcare in the state. Combining a number of federal funding
streams would “allow[] the creation of global health care budgets
with negotiated reimbursement rates for all providers” within a
state.68
H.R. 5010 requires that states “provide an assurance that the
State has legal authority to implement such plan or has enacted the
law described in subsection (b)(2).” That is, in order to be eligible
for a waiver the state legislature must pass a law, or the state
governor must issue an executive order creating a single-payer
plan.69 Essentially, then, what H.R. 5010 would do is simply remove
the major federal roadblocks to implementing single-payer
legislation already enacted in a state. It could be especially
encouraging to states that have come close to enacting single-payer
but saw such a program as untenable due to existing federal
restrictions.
Khanna and the bill’s supporters laud a state-based federally
backed effort as the true path to single-payer in the United States.
Relying on the history of Canada’s Medicare program, which began
as a public hospital insurance program in Saskatchewan, supporters
of state-based single-payer argue that its adoption throughout the
United States is inevitable as early adopting states demonstrate its
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merits to others.70 That is, “progressive states”71 would serve as
laboratories of democracy, demonstrating the merits of single-payer
to the rest of the country and leading other states to adopt similar
programs.72
H.R. 5010 heats up the simmering action toward states going it
alone on single-payer healthcare. But is state-level single-payer a
step on the path toward national single-payer like it was in Canadian
provinces? And how does one state’s implementation of a singlepayer system affect people in states that do not implement a singlepayer system? How does it affect the broader struggle for a national
single-payer program?
III. THE MYTH OF STATES AS LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY
This Section argues that, by allowing states to implement their
own individual single-payer legislation and favoring a state-based
laboratories approach, the federal government would deepen state70
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by-state and regional health inequalities it has a responsibility to
prevent and discourage. Drawing on existing examples of states as
“laboratories” of healthcare reform—the ACA Medicaid expansion
and state Medicaid waivers in general—this paper argues only a
national single-payer program can protect and promote the health of
all U.S. residents, particularly when it comes to systematically
oppressed groups who bear the brunt of health inequities in the
country. Furthermore, I argue one of the most important benefits of
a single-payer program—the bargaining power of a large federal
payer—is diluted and undermined by state single-payer programs in
a way that further deepens regional and other health disparities,
leaving individuals in non-single-payer states worse off.
Finally, employing a political theory analysis to argue that, even
if only a few states implemented single-payer systems, popular
momentum toward a national single-payer system would regress,
and therefore that state-based single-payer healthcare is actually a
stumbling block rather than a steppingstone toward health justice
because it makes national single-payer less likely while deepening
nationwide health inequities.
A. The State of Laboratories of Democracy in Healthcare
The premise that state-level experimentation in the area of
healthcare and healthcare financing will improve the healthcare
system is flawed, and H.R. 5010 and state single-payer advocates
rely heavily on this premise. The press release announcing the
introduction of the bill quoted a supporter as saying “Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis urged each state to ‘ . . . serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.’ Let’s bring healthcare reform back to the
states.”73 Another supporter stated the “proposal allows us to use
federal funding to prove the concept of Medicare for All.”74 But the
federal government has long given states the freedom to experiment
with healthcare, and those experiments have only deepened
nationwide healthcare disparities and contributed to our fragmented,
ineffective, and inefficient healthcare system.
The primary manner in which the federal government allows
states to experiment with healthcare financing and delivery models
is by administering Medicaid “waiver” programs. Medicaid
provides health insurance coverage to approximately seventy-five
million Americans (making it by far the nation’s largest health
insurer), including eligible low-income adults, children, pregnant
73
https://khanna.house.gov/media/press-releases/release-rep-khanna-introducesstate-based-universal-health-care-act-landmark
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women, older adults, and disabled people. Medicaid is administered
by states, according to federal requirements, and the program is
funded jointly by states and the federal government. Although
federal law provides the general requirements and typically sets the
floor for coverage requirements for state Medicaid programs, the
federal government permits states to apply to waive certain
requirements of federal Medicaid law and experiment with
alternative ways of administering their programs. According to the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), Medicaid
waivers “are vehicles states can use to test new or existing ways to
deliver and pay for health care services in Medicaid . . . .”75 In other
words, Medicaid waivers allow states to serve as laboratories of
democracy in healthcare.
States can use Medicaid waivers not just to experiment with
expanding eligibility to new groups of new covered services, but
also to restrict eligibility and covered services. And many states
have consistently used the waiver program to do the latter. For
example, as of February 2021, nineteen states had requested waivers
to impose work requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries. Sixteen
states had requested waivers to restrict eligibility and enrollment,
and fifteen had requested waivers to restrict benefits. These
restrictions include lifetime limits on enrollment, and even
requirements that Medicaid beneficiaries pay premiums and
copays.76 Waivers that restrict coverage and complicate eligibility
rules result in churn from Medicaid programs (meaning individuals
and families often experience gaps in coverage) and worsened
health outcomes. Tennessee, South Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia,
Alabama, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, for example, impose work
requirements77 on parents receiving Medicaid. These states also
have some of the highest infant and maternal and infant mortality
rates in the country. This represents a clear mismatch between the
healthcare needs of a state’s residents and how its politicians choose
75
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to “innovate” in the area of healthcare finance and delivery. The idea
that state innovation in healthcare is serving the unique needs of
states’ residents—an idea that undergirds calls for states to lead the
way on single-payer—is misguided.
The federal government—often through the courts—can and has
served as a backstop when states go too far in using waiver programs
to restrict coverage. In Gresham v. Azar,78 the D.C. Circuit struck
down a Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]-approved
Arkansas Medicaid work requirement waiver because “[t]he
primary purpose of Medicaid is to enable states to provide medical
services to those whose ‘income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services.’”79 The court held
Arkansas could not subordinate the Medicaid statute’s primary
purpose to achieve the state’s secondary goals, such as “the
objective of transitioning beneficiaries away from government
benefits through either financial independence or commercial
coverage.”80 In other words, regardless of how little a state wishes
to provide Medicaid coverage to eligible populations, because “the
primary purpose of Medicaid is to achieve the praiseworthy social
objective of granting health care coverage to those who cannot
afford it.”81
Some of the most egregiously restrictive waivers are denied by
HHS or struck down by courts prior to their actual implementation,
so it is easier to determine their intent than their actual effect on
enrollees or potential enrollees. But states’ efforts to restrict
coverage and impose extra requirements on Medicaid recipients tell
us something about what state innovation really means in practice
and how it is often detrimental to health. It demonstrates that rather
than some laudable innovation based on the unique needs of state
residents, states often seek to undermine the very purpose of
Medicaid through waiver authority.
Unfortunately, in the case of Arkansas, the state’s work
requirement program was in fact implemented months before a court
challenge resulted in its invalidation, so its deleterious effects are
well-known, and serve as an example of the duplicitousness of
arguments that state experimentation in a program whose primary
purpose is providing healthcare to the poor is good for its own sake.
And worse, it highlights the duplicitousness of arguments that
78
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states—no matter how well-situated they are to understand the
unique needs of their populations—will act in good faith in
experimenting with the Medicaid program. In the nine months
between the Arkansas waiver’s implementation and its invalidation,
“approximately
twelve
percent
of
those
with
Arkansas Medicaid lost coverage yet without significant change in
employment or community engagement [the stated purpose of the
waiver]. Before the work requirement, roughly three percent of
the Medicaid population was unemployed; after implementation,
that number rose to just under four percent.”82 More importantly,
though, “over eighteen thousand persons lost their health insurance
for failing to meet the Arkansas work and reporting requirements,
and that was before the full phase-in of the program to all age
groups.”83
After those disastrous results had become clear, Arkansas still
defended the work requirement all the way up to the Supreme Court.
Researchers have demonstrated, in the case of Arkansas and
other states, that Medicaid work requirements also had “strong
negative implications for state economies.”84 Essentially, state
governments, while making claims that public welfare programs are
too costly, have shown a willingness to go as far as to sacrifice
revenue so long as they could make a statement to undermine health
justice. For example, “[a]n analysis of the impact of disenrollment
caused by work requirements in New Hampshire suggested the loss
of between seven and eleven percent of the state's entire budget.”85
This further illustrates the irrationality, from a laboratories of
democracy standpoint, of state healthcare reform legislation. It
demonstrates that state governments can operationalize federalism
to undermine health justice goals, entrench state-by-state inequality,
and ignore the needs of their residents to which the laboratories of
democracy theory holds state governments are uniquely attuned.
Therefore, the underlying premise of federal legislation like H.R.
5010—the idea states can “prove” state single-payer to other states,
who will then adopt it, is false. The Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion is an exemplar of this problem.
B. The Test Case: The Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansion
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H.R. 5010’s optimism that once some states begin to adopt
single-payer, other states will see the light, as was the case with
“[o]ur neighbors in Canada,” belies the true nature and history of
voluntary state-based healthcare reform in the United States.
“Efforts to expand health coverage across the United States have
always encountered the country’s deep commitment to racism . . . .
For instance, in the 1940s, Southern Democrats conditioned their
votes for the Hospital Survey and Construction Act on a rule that
states be allowed to allocate resources locally, so that they could
drive new hospital construction away from African American
communities.”86 The deployment of states’ rights arguments
continues to undercut health justice today. “In 2012, when the
Supreme Court willfully gutted the [ACA’s Medicaid expansion],
some states took advantage of this to deny their citizens health
coverage . . . . In these states, more than half of those who would
have benefitted from the expansion were people of color.87 In
addition to the long history of states using Medicaid waivers to
provide less coverage to fewer people with more restrictions, this
recent example—the ACA’s voluntary Medicaid expansion—
demonstrates that no number of positive results from other states can
induce states hostile to the healthcare interests of their populations
to adopt even the least costly means of expanding healthcare access
and improving healthcare quality.
One of the ACA’s most successful provisions was its massive
expansion of the Medicaid program, which brought twelve million
people into Medicaid coverage, largely by expanding Medicaid to
cover non-disabled childless adults, a population previously left out
of the program. The federal government also agreed to finance
coverage of the expansion population at higher-than-typical levels
in the federal-state program. The ACA provided funding to cover
one hundred percent of the costs of newly eligible enrollees until the
end of 2016, and the federal share has since phased down to a stillhigh ninety percent, maintaining the appeal for states of covering the
expansion population. However, the Supreme Court, in National
Federation of Independent Businesses [NFIB] v. Sebelius,88 laid the
groundwork for a telling test of whether state governments could be
counted on to expand healthcare services to their most vulnerable
residents when they had every possible incentive to do so.
In NFIB, the Court held the federal government could not
penalize states who refused to expand Medicaid under the ACA’s
86
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terms by taking away their existing (non-expansion, pre-ACA)
Medicaid funding,89 essentially converting the ACA’s mandatory
expansion of Medicaid into an optional one. In other words, states
that then decided to take the optional Medicaid expansion would be
the laboratories in which the expansion was tested and proven.
States that expanded Medicaid demonstrated not only improved
health outcomes, but also cost savings. Notably, the Medicaid
expansion made a significant dent in regional health disparities
typically seen in the South as compared to other regions of the
country, but only in Southern states that expanded Medicaid. A 2020
study of more than 15,000 non-elderly adults in the putative
expansion population found that “for low-income adults in the
South, Medicaid expansion yielded health benefits—even for those
with established access to safety-net care [prior to the expansion].”90
The study compared four expansion states in the South and nine
non-expansion states and found that, in expansion states, higher
proportions of low-income adults “maintained their baseline health
status” and “reported increases in Medicaid coverage” and reported
lower proportions of “health status decline.”91 Although the study
found 86 percent of its subjects were already enrolled at community
health centers (i.e., they were receiving some type of free or lowcost primary care even if not previously enrolled in Medicaid), it
still found improvements, likely because although “non-expansion
states might have safety net providers—such as federally qualified
health centers, which provide care regardless of income—such
facilities generally do not offer the specialty care that Medicaid
does.”92
Furthermore, a 2019 study estimated the Medicaid expansion
saved “at least 19,000 lives” and—tragically—“state decisions not
to expand have led to 15,000 premature deaths.”93 And the number
89
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of lives saved by the expansion is likely far underestimated because,
“the study omits four states and Washington, D.C. that expanded
Medicaid under the ACA but did so before 2014 [when the Medicaid
expansion became optional following NFIB]. In total, these states
now cover about 8.6 million people, or about 20 percent as many as
are covered in the expansion states the study does include.”94
It is perhaps belaboring the point to use studies to explain what
seems like an obvious fact—that giving more people Medicaid,
which is by many metrics the best health insurance plan in the
country,95 leads to better health outcomes—but recall the two-tiered
welfare system and its notions of deservingness and personal
responsibility. As illustrated in I, the current non-universal
healthcare system shifts social blame toward poor people, disabled
people, Black and indigenous people, and other oppressed groups
while reinforcing the idea that affluent people “earn” their better
health outcomes; even a non-universal program like the Medicaid
expansion has begun to upset that. As empirical evaluations of the
Medicaid expansion indicate, poor people did not need simply to
take more “personal responsibility” for their health or change their
“lifestyle” to avoid early death; they needed healthcare. And this
challenge to the American notion that poor health outcomes are not
dictated by systems but rather by individual choices is a challenge
state governments in non-expansion states seek to stifle at any cost.
These state governments are not simply waiting for other states to
prove the merits of expanding Medicaid before they do it
themselves, and their actions are neither innocuous nor rational
when viewed through a health justice lens. Rather, they are proof
that, when it comes to healthcare the “laboratories of democracy”
theory has been tested and it has failed. State governments will
deliberately avoid proven ways to improve health outcomes if it
means expanding notions of deservingness and shared humanity.
But what about the price tag? Is it not possible that the twelve
state governments refusing to expand Medicaid are simply doing so
because they cannot afford it? Or because their residents do not want
the expansion? Are they well-intentioned but `simply “fiscally
conservative”? Evidence suggests the answer to these questions is a
resounding no. Not only is the Medicaid expansion almost entirely
94
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funded without state money, but also most available data indicate
the Medicaid expansion actually makes existing Medicaid programs
cheaper for states overall. Furthermore, several state governments
in non-expansion states have fiercely resisted—through legislation
and court challenges—popular efforts to expand Medicaid through
ballot initiatives and other forms of direct democracy.
As of 2020, any state offering Medicaid to the expansion
population is now responsible for ten percent of its funding—
approximately $100 million in the median expansion state,
compared to the existing approximately $2 billion in median
spending on existing Medicaid programs.96 The federal government
picks up ninety percent of the bill. Despite the very low “sticker
price” of the expansion, however, the net cost to states is lower and
“[i]n some cases . . . the net cost is negative.”97 States can expand
Medicaid and maintain a balanced budget without cutting other
spending or raising revenue.98 The Medicaid expansion comes at a
low cost to states because of the high federal contribution to state
programs, and research has found it saves states even more money
because “expanding eligibility allows states to cut spending in other
parts of their Medicaid programs” as well as “on state-funded health
services for the uninsured.”99 Researchers also theorize “expansion
may increase state revenues due to taxes related to Medicaid
expansion or taxes on the increased economic activity it triggers.”100
So, twelve state governments have resisted the Medicaid
expansion despite its health benefits and its fiscal advantages—the
latter of which are of special concern to states, which, in contrast to
96

Bryce Ward, The Commonwealth Fund, The Impact of Medicaid Expansion on
States’
Budgets
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2020/may/impact-medicaid-expansion-states-budgets. Ward notes that
“[w]hile this is large in absolute terms, it is still small relative to state spending
on traditional Medicaid. In 2018, total state spending on traditional Medicaid was
more than $229 billion, and over $2 billion in the median state.” Id.
97
Bryce Ward, The Commonwealth Fund, The Impact of Medicaid Expansion on
States’
Budgets
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2020/may/impact-medicaid-expansion-states-budgets.
98
Bryce Ward, The Commonwealth Fund, The Impact of Medicaid Expansion on
States’
Budgets
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2020/may/impact-medicaid-expansion-states-budgets.
99
Bryce Ward, The Commonwealth Fund, The Impact of Medicaid Expansion on
States’
Budgets
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2020/may/impact-medicaid-expansion-states-budgets.
100
Bryce Ward, The Commonwealth Fund, The Impact of Medicaid Expansion
on
States’
Budgets
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issuebriefs/2020/may/impact-medicaid-expansion-states-budgets.

32
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3927217

the federal government, are not currency issuers and typically have
balanced budget requirements. Expansion states have proven the
Medicaid expansion works, and according to the laboratories of
democracy theory and the proponents of state-based single-payer,
this should lead the twelve state governments that have refused the
Medicaid expansion to take it up, yet they have not done so, at the
expense of at least 15,000 lives lost. And they have refused the
expansion despite democratic pressure from their residents.
In 2020, Missouri residents—frustrated with the state
government’s refusal to expand Medicaid, took the issue directly to
the people. Missouri voters approved a ballot initiative that would
amend the state’s constitution to expand Medicaid as set forth in the
ACA. Missouri’s referendum came shortly after a similar successful
ballot initiative in Oklahoma. Oklahoma’s ballot initiative passed
despite objections from lawmakers and the state’s governor, who
tried to persuade voters “that approving Medicaid expansion would
lead to dire budget cuts or tax increases . . . .”101
The Medicaid expansion in Oklahoma went into effect on July 1,
2021. But in Missouri, lawmakers refused to allow democracy to
have the last word. The state’s challenge to the ballot initiative made
it all the way to the Missouri Supreme Court. On July 23, 2021, the
Missouri Supreme Court ruled the ballot initiative did not violate
state law and the Medicaid expansion would go into effect.
Grassroots movements in four other states—Idaho, Utah,102
Maine,103 and Nebraska104—took the ballot initiative route,
bypassing state governments hostile to the expansion and
experiencing official resistance along the way. In 2018, a coalition
by the name of Reclaim Idaho launched a statewide door-to-door
canvassing campaign that resulted in another successful ballot
initiative to expand Medicaid. Reclaim Idaho’s inspirational
grassroots efforts were documented extensively in local and national
media and in an award-winning documentary film. Idaho’s ballot
initiative served as an example of the power of popular resistance to
state governments hostile to health justice and as an example of just
how hard popular movements must work in order to put health
101
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justice on the agenda when state governments have such a great
degree of power over whether health justice is realized. Many
volunteers knocked on thousands of doors, sat in neighbors’ living
rooms, and heard stories of family tragedies and bankruptcies
caused by lack of healthcare.105 One volunteer said of her
canvassing work to obtain signatures for the ballot initiative:
“Republicans, Democrats, everybody wanted insurance for
somebody who needed it.” She said—of the more than one thousand
doors she knocked, only a single person refused to sign the petition
and “even if they were personally unsure about Medicaid expansion,
at least thought it should be on the ballot for the public to decide.”106
Unlike in Missouri, the state government did not immediately lash
out at the initiative through direct legal challenges. Medicaid
expansion in Idaho would go into effect on January 1, 2020, making
more than 90,000 Idahoans newly eligible for Medicaid.107 Reclaim
Idaho was democracy in action, but the state government had other
plans for the future of its laboratory. “In response to the Medicaid
expansion, Republicans in the House and Senate in 2019 tried to
make the initiative process nearly impossible so they could head off
future measures such as raising the minimum wage and legalizing
marijuana.”108 In states like Idaho, Maine, and Missouri, state
governments have demonstrated they are only amenable to being
“laboratories of democracy” if they, rather than the people, are the
ones doing the experiments.
That twelve state governments have refused the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion is as clear an indicator as any that the
“laboratories of democracy” theory has been tested in the healthcare
and health justice domain and failed. State governments continue to
reject the Medicaid expansion despite overwhelming evidence that
it both saves money and improves health outcomes. It is estimated
that about four million currently uninsured people in the U.S. would
be covered by Medicaid if the remaining quarter of states
105
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implemented the expansion, and these “state decisions about
Medicaid expansion . . . exacerbate geographic disparities in health
coverage” and “disproportionately affect people of color,
particularly Black Americans.”109 The federal government cannot
continue to leave patients at the mercy of states, and single-payer
advocates cannot continue to accept the laboratories of democracy
theory as truth. State governments’ experiments in healthcare
financing—particularly experiments directed at the poor—engender
and deepen existing health injustices, including racial and regional
health inequities, and states have demonstrated that they are not
capable of or interested in promoting health justice. Although
proponents of state-base single-payer healthcare see the
“laboratories of democracy” model as the ticket to single-payer, the
realities of state government action on healthcare demonstrate state
single-payer advocates are misguided.
H.R. 5010 or similar enabling legislation, if passed, would lay
the groundwork for states to implement their own single-payer
systems, but it is virtually guaranteed that this will not lead to other
states implementing single-payer the way “[o]ur neighbors in
Canada”110 did, leaving national single-payer the only remaining
option for a nationwide system in which healthcare is provided
based on need rather than ability to pay. However, this is of course
not fatal to the prospect of single-payer passing in some states, but
other practical and political realities counsel against the
implementation of state single-payer. I now turn to a deeper
problem: that if the well-meaning efforts of state single-payer
advocates result in some states implementing a single-payer system
while others do not, state single-payer is a stumbling block rather
than a stepping stone to health justice. Leaving single-payer up to
the states in the short-term will not only worsen state-by-state and
regional health disparities, but also make national single-payer less
likely to pass than it is now.
IV. THE BARGAINING POWER PROBLEM WITH STATE SINGLEPAYER
Having demonstrated that granting states permission to
implement their own single-payer programs will not lead to other
states doing the same, I now turn to the problems inherent in creating
109
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yet another patchwork health financing system in which some states
have state-specific single-payer programs and others do not. Statelevel single payer is a stumbling block on the path toward the health
justice goals of a national single-payer program because it would
dilute both payer and patient bargaining power in a way that is
harmful to the people already most disadvantaged by the fragmented
and state-based healthcare system that currently exists in the United
States. Furthermore, it would chill popular momentum toward a
national single-payer program and make national single-payer less
likely, at least in the short-term.
One of the primary advantages of a single-payer public
healthcare program is that it greatly increases the overall bargaining
power of both patients and the public payer.111 The payer has
bargaining power over providers, hospitals, and drug companies,
and therefore can lower costs to itself, making universal healthcare
delivery possible.112 And patients—the public at large—have
bargaining power as to the payer, both because of the due process
protections that come with receiving public healthcare coverage and
because the public is better able to assert bargaining power against
a government payer than against a private payer, in which every
patient is just one person bargaining with their insurance company.
This Section discusses the nature of that bargaining power and
argues first that state single-payer will unacceptably diminish the
power of the federal payer to provide healthcare to the most
vulnerable Americans in states hostile to health justice. Second, I
conclude by employing a political theory analysis to argue that the
bargaining power of the U.S. public in favor of national single-payer
will be diminished by the implementation of single-payer in even
just a few states, chilling popular momentum toward national singlepayer and making national single-payer less likely than it is now.
A. The Importance of Bargaining Power in Healthcare
Since the early days of Medicare and Medicaid, the federal
government has demonstrated the advantages of negotiating
healthcare rates, prices, and conditions as a large public payer.
Medicaid (in addition to the Veterans Administration) is lauded for
111
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wielding its bargaining power to keep costs—including drug
prices—low and achieve good outcomes even as it provides
healthcare to some of the country’s most medically vulnerable
patients.113 And federal programs have some a history and a great
deal of potential of wielding their power as the nation’s largest
insurer to promote health justice. It was only after the enactment of
Medicare—and Medicare’s subsequent refusal to reimburse
segregated hospitals—that U.S. hospitals were desegregated
“virtually overnight.”114 Medicare is among the most important
achievements of the Civil Rights Era. On July 30, 1965, President
Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law a bill that established Medicare
Part A and Part B, which would take effect in 1966. In 1966,
Southern hospitals were
barred
from
participating
in
the Medicare program unless they discontinued their long-standing
practice of racial segregation. The federal payer was simply too
large and too powerful—it had too much bargaining power—for any
hospital to refuse its funding in order to preserve hospital
segregation.
Perhaps the most salient demonstration of the importance of
bargaining power of a single payer is an example of how denying
the federal payer bargaining power worsens health outcomes and
deepens health inequities while also increasing costs to both patients
and the payer. “Over 40% of the revenue for 12 leading multinational pharmaceutical companies comes from the United States .
. . ,”115 in part because the country’s largest healthcare payer,
Medicare,116 is prohibited by law from playing any direct role in
113
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negotiating and setting drug prices for beneficiaries of Part D,
Medicare’s prescription drug coverage program.
The final Medicare Part D bill was enacted as part of the
Medicare Modernization Act (“MMA”).117 The bill also transferred
“dual eligibles”—individuals eligible for coverage under both
Medicare and Medicaid—to Medicare from Medicaid for drug
insurance coverage. “In addition to transactional and administrative
challenges, the transition of dual eligibles’ prescription drug
coverage from Medicaid to Medicare increased their costs for
prescription drugs and simultaneously decreased the types of drugs
available to them” because Medicare’s hands were tied on drugpricing negotiation.118
The MMA adopted a “laissez-faire approach” to drug
pricing. While under Medicaid the government negotiates
the drug prices, under Part D the negotiating power is
transferred to PDPs, private entities who then negotiate drug
costs directly with pharmaceutical companies. The MMA
expressly prohibits the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) from negotiating prescription drug prices
on behalf of Medicare enrollees. CRS found that while “[i]n
theory, the federal government may be able to leverage its
market share to negotiate lower prices,” the
“noninterference” clause prevents the government from
seeking lower prices. The House recognized this problem
and, in January 2007, passed the Medicare Prescription
Drug Price Negotiation Act. The Act would have required
the Secretary to negotiate drug prices for this coverage, but
the Senate failed to pass the bill.119
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Because of Medicare Part D’s noninterference clause,
“Medicare Part D pays on average 73% more than Medicaid and
80% more than VA for brand name drugs. The federal government
could save between $15.2 and $16 billion a year if Medicare Part D
paid the same prices as Medicaid or VA.”120 “Since 2006,
government programs have paid for approximately 40% of the retail
prescription drug expenditure in the United States. In large part as a
result of skyrocketing drug prices, total spending on Medicare Part
D is projected to increase from $103 billion in 2016 to $216 billion
in 2025.”121 A 2008 study “found an approximately 8% increase in
the costs of prescription drugs for dual eligibles [individuals eligble
for both Medicare and Medicaid, with Medicare as the primary
payer] under Medicare as compared to Medicaid.94 The study also
found that for drugs that dual eligibles use most heavily, drug
companies reported an increase in their profits after the transition
from Medicaid to Medicare.”122 The Medicare part D
noninterference clause increases profits for drug companies and
costs for both patients and the government.123 It represents the worst
effects of stripping a large payer of its potential bargaining power.
120
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In addition to payer bargaining power, a healthcare system must
also feature patient bargaining power if it seeks to maximize health
outcomes. In the current U.S. healthcare system, those who receive
public health insurance have a significant amount of bargaining
power as to the payer, something often lacking among those with
private insurance. Being the beneficiary of a government payer even
increases the bargaining power of an individual patient, acting alone
to pursue care, as to the payer. This is because of the increased due
process protections available to patients seeking care under
government health programs, protections not available to
individuals who have no insurance or private insurance where
coverage decisions are made in an administrative black box and
provide far less deference to physician recommendations than
government payers.
Individuals receiving health coverage under government
programs such as Medicaid benefit from due process protections
prior to changes to or terminations of coverage. Because a national
single-payer program would cover every U.S. resident, this type of
bargaining power would become slightly less relevant as traditional
means-testing fades and people have to prove far less to demonstrate
general eligibility for single-payer coverage. However, when it
comes to actual decisions about covered services, a single-payer
system provides a protection that no profit-motivated private health
insurance coverage does: longstanding precedent going all the way
up to the United States Supreme Court mandates that government
payers defer to provider recommendations when determining
medical necessity, and therefore determining what specific health
services, durable medical equipment, and drugs must be paid for by
the payer.
In Weaver v. Reagen,124 Medicaid recipients with AIDS
challenged a Missouri Medicaid rule that precluded coverage for the
drug AZT for AIDS patients except in certain circumstances. The
patients’ treating providers had prescribed and recommended the
drug, but Missouri still refused to cover it. The Eighth Circuit held
that Missouri Medicaid could not deny AZT for patients whose
physicians prescribed it, even though at the time, AZT was
considered an off-label use of the drug by both Missouri and the
FDA. The court stated:
the fact that FDA has not approved labeling of a drug for a
particular use does not necessarily bear on those uses of the
drug that are established within the medical and scientific
community as medically appropriate. It would be improper
for the State of Missouri to interfere with a physician's
judgment of medical necessity by limiting coverage of AZT
124
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based on criteria that admittedly do not reflect current
medical knowledge or practice.125
The Eighth Circuit expanded upon its holding in Pinneke v.
Preisser,126 in which it held the denial of a gender-affirming surgery
deemed medically necessary by the patient’s physician violated the
Medicaid act. The court laid out a general principle that illustrates
the stark contrast between how government payers make coverage
decisions and how private payers make coverage decisions. The
court stated, “The decision of whether or not certain treatment or a
particular type of surgery is ‘medically necessary’ rests with the
individual recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or
government officials.”127 Surely, patients seeking appropriate care
still face obstacles even with public insurance, but even where
courts have not found such a sweeping deference to provider
recommendations is necessary under Medicaid statutes, they have
still found patients have recourse when a government payer denies
coverage for a particular service. Courts have found Title XIX of the
Social Security Act, which governs Medicaid, still requires a state
Medicaid program’s decision to limit services based on the degree
of medical necessity to be reasonable.128 The requirement that
government payers defer to treating providers’ determinations of
medical necessity provides protections that private insurance does
not. Although federal law mandates the decision whether Medicaid
will cover a service does not lie in the hands of “clerical personnel”
who have never met or interacted with patients, nearly every
coverage determination for a patient with private insurance does.
One of the primary methods through which private insurers
ration care is coverage denials. By denying care to their members,
private insurers can increase profits.129 Rationing care via the denial
125
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of coverage is rational from the perspective of a profit-motivated
private insurer because it maintains incoming payments (premiums)
without spending money on care. This method of rationing is less
available to government payers because of the requirement that
government payers defer to providers’ recommendations for
medically necessary treatment, and Medicaid’s prohibition on states
arbitrarily denying or reducing a service to a recipient because of
their diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.130 Rationing care based
on profit concerns is the antithesis of a health justice-promoting
system that provides care based on need rather than ability to pay.
By operating under legal standards of deference to healthcare
providers’ treatment determinations, a public healthcare program
promotes health justice and reduces health disparities by doing a
better job of ensuring individuals receive the care they need. In
doing this, a public program places an individual patient on a far
more level playing field with the healthcare payer than they are in
the current system, in which health insurance companies expend
money and human resources for the sole purpose of ensuring profits
at the expense of care.
Of course, as discussed later, individual patients alone cannot
effect massive structural changes. The prevalence of legal services
organizations focused on appealing coverage denials and decisions
under public insurance programs is one demonstration of how, even
with increased due process protections, healthcare is often out of
reach of poor people, people of color, and other oppressed people
because of the history of discrimination in healthcare and other
social domains. These problems are exacerbated by the escalating
privatization of Medicaid; in most states, Medicaid is outsourced to
HMOs and other private insurance companies. Public programs can
and should get better, and popular rather than individual bargaining
power must be exerted to bring this about. Nonetheless, patients
have far more bargaining power against public than private payers.
B. State Single-Payer and Federal Bargaining Power
In addition to the unlikelihood of successful state single-payer
programs being adopted by states that have traditionally refused to
President Nixon: “Well, that appeals to me.”
Ehrlichman: “Edgar Kaiser is running his Permanente deal for profit. And the
reason that he can … the reason he can do it … I had Edgar Kaiser come in
… talk to me about this and I went into it in some depth. All the incentives
are toward less medical care, because … the less care they give them, the
more money they make.”
President Nixon: “Fine.” [Unclear.]
Ehrlichman: [Unclear] “… and the incentives run the right way.”
President Nixon: “Not bad.”
130
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expand healthcare access, the very adoption of single-payer in some
states would deepen persistent regional health inequities in the
United States by leaving individuals in states that do not adopt
single-payer worse off than they are now. Because health justice
“requires a regulatory and jurisprudential approach that consistently
and reliably considers the health ramifications of judicial and
legislative decision making,”131 H.R. 5010 or other legislation
enabling state-based single-payer are not acceptable actions for the
federal government to take under a health justice lens if they will
worsen health disparities.
The move to state-based single-payer plans in some states would
deepen state-by-state health disparities in one primary way. The
movement of individual states’ populations out of the existing
public federal system will decrease the overall bargaining power of
existing federal healthcare payers like Medicaid and Medicare. It
would do so by reducing the number of people insured by federal
programs once people in individual states move to the state plan.132
This would weaken the bargaining power of federal programs which
pay for care for the country’s most vulnerable patients. For example,
if California and New York—sites of some of the most promising
efforts toward state single-payer—adopt state-based plans, their
twelve million and five million Medicaid recipients, respectively,
would be moved out of the federal Medicaid population.
Nationwide, Medicaid covers seventy-five million people, and
removing just those two states would bring that number to around
fifty-three million people, less than the number of people covered
by UnitedHealthcare, the nation’s largest private insurer. This
massive reduction in bargaining power of the federal payer could
have serious implications for how Medicaid manages costs among
its remaining beneficiaries.
Removing millions of people from the Medicaid and Medicare
populations will result in a reduction of the existing federal payers’
ability to negotiate low drug prices (in the case of Medicaid) and
131
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provider reimbursement rates. An increase in Medicaid costs will
squeeze state budgets and further incentivize non-single-payer states
to cut Medicaid costs in any way they can. That is, the use of waivers
to restrict coverage and benefits and increase patient cost-sharing,
as well as some states’ refusal to cover optional groups such as the
ACA Medicaid expansion group, would only increase as state
Medicaid costs increase due to the dilution of federal bargaining
power.
State-level reforms do not exist in a vacuum, and national
policymakers—and health justice advocates—must consider the
broader implications of state-level policies. In particular, state-based
single-payer programs, by reducing the bargaining power of the
federal payer without making a national single-program more likely,
deepen some of the very inequities a single-payer program is
designed to address. Other areas of law and policy acknowledge the
fundamental differences in motivation between states and the
federal government. For example, part of the justification for
national-level environmental regulations is the fear that states acting
alone could improve their own air and water by offloading damaging
externalities to other states. If states, acting alone, can deepen
nationwide regional inequality in healthcare, a national scope for
health is just as necessary as a national (or global) scope of analysis
in the context of environmental protection.
C. Popular Bargaining Power and Mass Movements
I now draw on the introductory discussion of how universal
programs create large cross-demographic constituencies and discuss
the converse: the fracturing of constituencies inherent in nonuniversal reforms. I will also discuss how moving large swaths of
people into state-based single-payer programs would chill
momentum toward a national single-payer program by splitting up
a growing national constituency in favor of single-payer healthcare.
Because of this, I conclude, state-based single-payer is, in fact, a
stumbling block rather than a stepping stone to national single-payer
and to achieving health justice in the United States.
1. Stepping Stones and Stumbling Blocks—Evaluating
Reform Proposals
Not all healthcare reform promotes health justice. This is not
only true of reforms that explicitly seek to restrict healthcare, but
also sometimes true of reforms that, at least putatively, expand
coverage and access to care. In order to navigate the difficulty of
organizing and advocating for systems reform, social philosopher
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André Gorz proposed a taxonomy that would characterize putatively
“positive” reforms as reformist, non-reformist, or revolutionary.133
The “reformist” versus “non-reformist” reform framework is
employed in current-day discussions of political economy and
theory. “Articulated in protests, strikes, campaigns, and policy
platforms by organizations like Mijente, Black Visions Collective,
Sunrise Movement, the Right To The City Alliance, and the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, non-reformist
reforms provide a framework for thinking about reforms that aim to
build grassroots power as they redress the crises of our times.”134
The framework allows political analysis to move beyond
characterizing reforms as merely incremental or sweeping/sudden
and into a mode of analysis that looks at the quality of the reform
itself and whether it contributes to an end goal of systems change
(non-reformist) or further entrenches oppressive structures
(reformist).
A reformist reform is one that “subordinates its objectives to the
criteria of rationality and practicability of a given system and policy.
Reformism rejects those objectives and demands—however deep
the need for them—which are incompatible with the preservation of
the system.”135 A non-reformist reform is one that “does not base its
validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria, and
rationales. A non-reformist reform is determined not in terms of
what can be, but what should be.”136 A revolutionary reform is one
that makes an “advance toward a radical transformation of
society.”137 Organizers and scholars have adopted the reformist
versus non-reformist framework as a way to set organizing and
political priorities. In the area of criminal legal system reform, for
example, a reformist might seek to apply technocratic “tweaks” such
as law enforcement data transparency and police-worn body
cameras. A non-reformist, however, would counter this reformist
position by asserting that tweaks simply make an “irreparabl[e]”138
system better able to continue functioning and would assert the only
solution to police violence is through abolishing the irreparable
system. Thus, a non-reformist would seek a reform that furthers the
133
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end goal of abolition and justice—such as defunding law
enforcement—as opposed to a “solution” such as body-worn
cameras or training, all of which require further funding of the
system and validate the system’s existence.139
Rachel Brewster helpfully provides another framework that
maps onto the reformist versus non-reformist concept. She
characterizes reforms as either “stepping stones” (non-reformist) or
“stumbling blocks” (reformist) toward an end goal because
“measures that are positive in a static sense can be self-defeating in
a dynamic sense.”140 In applying the characterization to climate
change policy, Brewster posits “[i]ncremental actions can prove to
be a stepping stone, easing the way to climbing higher, or
a stumbling block, a barrier that makes advancement more
difficult.”141 From a political theory standpoint, “[p]olicymakers are
constantly faced with the dilemma of whether to spend political
capital on an ambitious proposal or to settle for a partial measure
with the hope that it eventually will create greater support for the
more ambitious plan.”142 However—as I have argued when
discussing state governments’ hostility to health justice and will
argue in this Section—there are certainly indications that
policymakers do not in fact “hope” incremental reforms “eventually
will create greater support for the more ambitious plan.” Regardless
of that quibble over motivation, though, applying Brewster’s
stepping stones versus stumbling blocks analysis is a necessary step
in evaluating reforms under a health justice framework because U.S.
healthcare policy has been, for the past several decades, defined by
stumbling blocks.
An infamous feature of the political economy in U.S. healthcare
is what Paul Starr calls the “policy trap”—the phenomenon that
healthcare reforms create an “increasingly costly and complicated
system that has satisfied enough of the public and so enriched the
139
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health care industry as to make change extraordinary difficult.”143 In
other words, rather than transforming healthcare, public policy
further entrenches the perceived necessity of the existing ineffective
U.S. healthcare financing system; the reforms are stumbling blocks
because “[o]ur health care system is engineered, deliberately or not,
to resist change.”144 The portrayal of healthcare—a topic that
certainly affects every American’s life in deeply personal ways—as
a complicated issue to be analyzed and defined by economists and
other experts rather than the public at large, is an example of this.
Certainly, balking at systemic reforms because they are
“complicated”145—as though the current system is not—reinforces
the tendency toward stumbling blocks and reformist reforms. Both
supporters and opponents of certain healthcare reforms always
caution that policymakers must tread lightly on healthcare reform
primarily because it “would make fundamental changes to one sixth
of the economy.”146 This purely fiscal argument, Gorz would say,
“base[s] its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria,
and rationales”147 rather than on the urgent need to provide relief for
the millions of Americans who are sickened, forgotten, and
bankrupted by U.S. healthcare.
When Congress reforms the healthcare system, it often does just
enough to placate148 large and influential voting or lobbying blocs
143
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to make beneficiaries of some public programs suspicious of more
reform and to make the healthcare system seem so monumentally
complicated as to be incapable of large structural shifts.149 It creates
not only buy-in for the status quo, but also—more perniciously—
uses the veil of complicatedness to suggest that reforms and
demands can be made only piecemeal and conceived only from
above, by technocrats and experts. And the deeper the U.S. falls into
the “policy trap” the easier it is to present large-scale reforms like
national single-payer as untenable. Essentially, the policy trap is
paved with stumbling blocks. Every reform, rather than being
transformative, further entrenches a status quo that actually makes
it more difficult to achieve the transformative change required to
smooth the road toward health justice. Therefore, in order to
understand the health justice implications of moving forward with a
state-based single-payer program, one must look past its nominal
value and determine whether, politically, state-based single-payer
will in fact make national single-payer—and ultimately health
justice—more or less possible. I argue a federal policy favoring
state-based single-payer is a stumbling block, rather than a stepping
stone, to national single-payer and health justice in the United
States.
2. Fracturing Constituencies and Stigmatizing Poor
People’s Programs
In Section I, I briefly discussed the way public programs
create—and destroy—political constituencies and the way universal
programs create large cross-demographic constituencies. I now turn
a political theory analysis to discuss the implications of state-based
single-payer programs for the movement toward national singlepayer and, ultimately health justice. That is, is state single-payer a
stumbling block or a stepping stone to health justice? Specifically, I
argue state-based single-payer programs would fracture a growing
constituency in favor of a national single-payer program and chill
popular momentum toward a transformative non-reformist reform.
A fundamental feature of a universal national single-payer
system is a high level of patient/people bargaining power as
compared to the current fragmented system. This allows the public
to exert greater pressure on the payer to promote health justice and
be sensitive to the health needs and concerns of the population. In
“Placation, is simply a higher level tokenism because the groundrules allow havenots to advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide.”
Sherry Arnstein, A Ladder Of Citizen Participation, 35 JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION 216, 217, 220 (1969).
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addition to the due process-type bargaining power described above
that is inherent in a public healthcare system, national single-payer
increases popular bargaining power in another domain. Simply put,
larger numbers of patients can exert more power as to the public
payer, including bargaining for increased coverage of certain
services and better standards of care. This bargaining power is
increased when all individuals benefit from the same program and
benefit from its maintenance and improvement. Additionally, a
single public payer is more directly accountable to the people than
are dozens of private insurance companies across which U.S.
patients are currently distributed.
But the current system has compounding bargaining power
disadvantages that will only be worsened if state-based single-payer
is implemented as federal policy. First, the splitting of
constituencies among those who receive visible welfare (including
health programs like Medicaid) makes popular organizing around
health justice demands difficult, and this is worsened by the stigma
attached to those who receive means-tested public benefits. Second,
the current system gives rise to such entrenched and influential
private and professional networks that mass organizing among
exclusively those who receive means-tested benefits is unlikely to
result in the massive political pressure necessary to achieve singlepayer. Because of this, advocates of a national single-payer system
must seriously contend with the ways in which state single-payer
programs, although nominally positive, can hinder progress toward
transformational national reforms and undermine health justice.
Throttling popular momentum toward expansive social
programs such as universal single-payer healthcare is a strategy
often employed by politicians hostile to expanding social welfare,
and especially those reticent to expand public programs in a way
that would cause the public to begin to perceive those programs or
their benefits as rights.150 Medicaid, which covers one in five
Americans, is stigmatized because it covers the poor. And even
among those one in five Americans who receive Medicaid, there is
150
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no single Medicaid constituency because Medicaid comprises at
least a dozen separate programs with different constituencies
interested in their maintenance.
Splitting up constituencies is a long-standing practice in politics,
and it chills popular momentum toward expansive social programs.
At its most basic electoral level, splitting constituencies is popular
among politicians during the political apportionment process and is
“used to disenfranchise voters.”151 In voting rights law, scholars and
courts have described the common tactics of “packing,” “stacking,”
and “cracking” among those hostile to minority representation in
government. When trying to lessen the impact of the minority vote
or of a particular political party, state legislatures have “packed”
minority voters into districts “where their majority would be
overwhelming”152 but limited to that district. They have also
“split”153 or “cracked” voters by “fragmenting populations of . . .
voters among other districts where their voting strength would be
reduced”154 in order to avoid the voting bloc from achieving a
majority in any district. But slicing up constituencies to reduce their
power is accomplished in other sophisticated ways beyond purely
electoral gerrymandering.
Politicians who oppose the expansion of public programs have
long relied on demonizing those programs, reducing their numbers
of vocal advocates to few outside the constituency that benefits from
them directly.155 Splitting constituencies in the welfare policy arena
is accomplished by individualizing social ills and “otherizing” those
who benefit from public welfare programs for the poor, including
healthcare programs. In public programs for the poor, this stigma is
a fundamental and enduring feature,156 and it staves off popular
151
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momentum toward perceiving certain forms of welfare as rights, and
therefore avoids the building of popular momentum to support
universal programs like single-payer healthcare. Christopher
Howard describes the American welfare state as “two-tiered,” with
the “lower tier” consisting of “means-tested programs like AFDC
[now TANF] and Food Stamps” and the higher tier consisting
largely of tax-related benefits.157 Otherizing those in the lower tier
is accomplished by multiple means. The way in which public
welfare programs for the poor are administered is a stark contrast
from the “hidden welfare state” that benefits largely middle-class
and rich people.158
By framing the welfare state for the poor as the true “welfare”
and burying the welfare state for the rich in the tax code, politicians
ensure programs for the poor are always subject to stigma and are
threatened by austerity while welfare for the rich sits quietly in the
background. “Like means-tested programs, tax expenditures are
financed out of general revenues rather than contributory payroll
taxes. Yet most tax expenditures are structured as open-ended
entitlements; their receipt does not depend on the judgment of
caseworkers and does not entail social stigma.”159 Perhaps the
starkest example of the hidden welfare state is the mortgage interest
tax deduction, a welfare program administered through the tax code,
which cost the federal government $71 billion in 2015. The same
year, federal expenditures on the Housing Choice Voucher Program
(“Section 8”), a form of direct assistance, were approximately $30
billion. But when “welfare reform” is on the national agenda, it is
not the mortgage interest tax deduction that sits on the chopping
block.
The splitting apart of programs intended to enrich people’s
livelihoods into the two-tiered welfare state helps to ensure the
constituency that supports maintenance and expansion of the “lower
tier” benefits is small and divided from the rest of the population. It
ensures further stigmatization and separation of the poor from the
civic concept of the population as a whole. Furthermore, splitting of
constituencies is accomplished by the very nature of the fragmented
and highly individualized U.S. healthcare system.
punished the “paupers who were capable of working.” The Elizabethan Poor Laws
greatly influenced the American colonies. Each colony enacted laws that were
nearly identical—both in their welfare aims and moral overtones. And even as
welfare assistance evolved throughout early American history, it retained the
stigma it inherited.”).
157
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Activists and organizers are well-aware of this strategy to split
constituencies, and it complicates their fight for health justice. For
example, insulin-pricing advocacy groups in the United States have
expressed concern that drug-pricing reform will target insulin as a
low-hanging fruit. Insulin-pricing activists are one of the largest and
most visible health justice advocacy groups in the United States. In
early 2021, as a drug-pricing bill was batted around in Congress,
those organizing for free or low-cost insulin worried that their
visibility and the impact or their organizing would result not in
broad-based drug-pricing reform, but rather in chilling momentum
toward broader drug-pricing reform by placating insulin advocates
as a specific group.160 Their fears are well-placed. After the insulinpricing movement received significant media coverage in the late
2010s, particularly in the time leading up to the 2020 U.S.
Presidential election,161 a number of insulin-specific price reduction
bills were introduced in Congress.162 The bargaining power problem
with these gradual actions is that placating specific groups, often the
most well-organized groups, creates further splitting of the
constituency that might otherwise organize together for broader
drug-pricing reform. Placating a constituency allows politicians to
“return the genie of citizen power to the bottle from which it . . .
escaped.”163
But, although splitting up constituencies is largely seen as an
intentional strategy among politicians reticent to expand social
programs, state-based single-payer gives rise to the same issues,
however good its intentions are. Again, this is key to applying the
stepping stones and stumbling blocks framework, in which
nominally positive reforms must be subject to further analysis of
whether they will actually contribute to achieving the end goal,
which, here, is health justice. State-based single-payer not only
dilutes the bargaining power of the federal payers, which cover the
vast majority of poor, low-income, and older adult patients; it also
chills popular momentum toward a national single-payer system by
placating single-payer advocates in the states, chilling the
possibilities of mass organizing for a national program.
160
Death Panel Podcast: Surrogate Endnotes (Jun. 10, 2021) (downloaded using
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161
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3. The Task Ahead of National Single-Payer’s Proponents
Healthcare in the United States has become something far more
than medicine. “[I]n medicine the dream of reason has partially
come true. But medicine is also, unmistakably, a world of power
where some are more likely to receive the rewards of reason than
are others.”164 If politics is the process of power struggles over
public resource allocation, there is nothing more emblematic of U.S.
politics than its health financing system. Those who seek universal
healthcare in the United States face powerful entities in opposition:
state governments, physicians, and care profiteers like medical
device manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies. To counteract
these entrenched influences, popular organizing for national singlepayer is paramount, especially given the unlikelihood (described in
III) that the mere adoption of single-payer in some states will cause
the reform to catch on in other states. It is clear a strong popular
movement is necessary to push single-payer over the finish line in
the United States.
Power in the United States has coalesced around the highly
financialized, profit-motivated U.S. health system and subordinated
the care needs of the public to private interests for decades. Beyond
state governments that restrict healthcare, especially for the poor, a
host of interest groups that influence states and the federal
government are hostile to universal healthcare, and advocates of
single-payer healthcare must organize against. Chief among them
are physician lobbies and health insurance industry actors, which
have outsized influence in government that can curtail the influence
of mass popular movements. For example, “private physicians have
sought to keep government from competing with them, regulating
their practice, or, worst of all, incorporating medical care into the
state as a public service like education” and “[t]heir struggle to limit
the boundaries of public health, to confine public medical services
to the poor, and to prevent the passage of compulsory health
insurance all exemplify these concerns.”165
One of the country’s largest lobbying groups, the American
Medical Association (AMA)—a lobbying group for physicians—is
emblematic of the monied influence brought to bear against public
healthcare programs in the United States. “Hardly anywhere have
doctors been as successful as American physicians in resisting
164
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national insurance and maintaining a predominantly private and
voluntary financing system.”166 The AMA, with its veneer of
expertise in matters of life and death, has been tremendously
influential in U.S. healthcare politics. Researchers have found the
influence of the AMA in Congress is greater even than that of the
AFL-CIO167 and “[t]he lavish States andof the American Medical
Association (AMA) toward candidates for Congress has given it a
reputation as a purchaser of political influence.”168 This has
increasingly become true as the AMA’s political influence and
lobbying budget continues to grow while it represents a smaller and
smaller portion of physicians than ever.169 The AMA spent
$20,417,000 on lobbying in 2018.”170 It is one of the most influential
lobbying organizations in the United States, and has influenced the
development of “professional sovereignty”171 over the politics of
care in addition to medicine itself. “The dominance of the medical
profession . . . goes considerably beyond [its] rational foundation.
Its authority spills over its clinical boundaries into arenas of moral
and political action for which medical judgment is only partially
relevant and often incompletely equipped. Moreover, the profession
has been able to turn its authority into social privilege, economic
power, and political influence.” The medical profession, rather than
the population as a whole, “receives a radically disproportionate
share” of “rewards from medicine.”172 The AMA exerts an
incredible amount of influence on healthcare policy, particularly at
the federal level, and has long opposed single-payer healthcare in
particular.
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In the early 1930s, the AMA strongly opposed the inclusion of
publicly funded healthcare programs in Franklin Roosevelt’s
proposals for early Social Security reforms. Former labor activist
and Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins noted that the inclusion of
public healthcare programs was so strongly opposed by the AMA
that they “would have killed the whole Social Security Act if it had
been pressed at that time.”173 Even before proposals for robust
public healthcare programs gained steam, the AMA “[denounced]
modest proposals for group medicine and voluntary insurance . . . as
“socialized medicine.” As an indication of how the AMA exerts its
professional sovereignty beyond the millions of dollars it spends to
the detriment of healthcare reform is the AMA’s Truman-era tactic
of “lobbying of legislators by their own personal physicians.”
The ability of the AMA to exert such a profession-tinged
influence over healthcare policy is one of many examples of the task
ahead of national single-payer advocates seeking to out-leverage
moneyed interests. Because single-payer advocates are unlikely to
outspend groups like the AMA, the path to single-payer can only be
created by a mass politics that out-organized such groups and makes
forceful demands.
In addition to the AMA, power in the healthcare arena has
inhered “toward complexes of medical schools and hospitals,
financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies,
prepaid health plans, and health care chains, conglomerates, holding
companies, and other corporations.”174 Because of the power of
these entrenched interests, patients and the larger public are at a
significant bargaining disadvantage when it comes to healthcare
policy. Splitting the growing constituency for national single-payer
healthcare could have disastrous consequences for the movement.
I began by characterizing national single-payer healthcare as a
steppingstone to health justice in the United States. However, state
single-payer programs are a stumbling block to health justice not
only because of the payer bargaining power and economic issues
attendant to state single-payer, as described previously, but also
because of the public bargaining power problem described in this
Section. Mass public bargaining power is not necessary just to pass
single-payer in the first place; single-payer’s very maintenance and
ability to drive health justice depends on the continued capacity of
the public to pressure the healthcare payer to promote health justice
goals. Severing single-payer constituencies from one another—
which will no doubt occur if single-payer movements shift their
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efforts to individual states—has a chilling effect on mass organizing
toward both goals.
If the federal government grants states permission to implement
their own single-payer programs, it will fracture a growing
constituency in favor of national single-payer. In states with the
most organized single-payer advocates, applying that organization
to pass a state single-payer bill would placate some of single-payer’s
most vocal constituencies. This fracturing could make it difficult to
revive national popular momentum toward a national program in the
face of adoption of state single-payer. As discussed above, popular
momentum, rather than the momentum of successful state-based
“innovation” in single-payer healthcare is far more likely to bring
about a national single-payer program. Because of this, fracturing
the constituency for a national single-payer program would make
national single-payer less likely than it is now. In effect, singlepayer advocates would be splitting their own constituency.
CONCLUSION
However well-meaning proponents of state-specific singlepayer may be, the historical and legal realities of the laboratories of
democracy theory in healthcare illustrate the falsity their underlying
assumption: that state governments will act in the best interests of
their residents to implement single-payer once its merits are proven
by other trailblazing states. Furthermore, rather than being a neutral
or positive stepping stone toward national single-payer and health
justice, implementing state-specific single-payer is a stumbling
block that will weaken the power of existing federal payers, proving
harmful to patients in states that do not adopt their own single-payer
programs. Furthermore, state-specific single-payer will chill
popular momentum toward a national single-payer program,
undermining the health justice goals of a national program and
contributing to the further fragmentation of the U.S. healthcare
system.
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